Web Remote Control 0.9

HOW TO USE: https://github.com/EmptyCode0x86/Web-Remote-Control-System/blob/main/README.md

---

CHANGELOG:

10/07/2026
VER: 0.9

• Added: Share Link Expiry — Live Stream share links can now have a configurable lifetime. In the stream toolbar, set Hours and Minutes or enable No time limit. The backend registers sessions in ShareSessionService; ShareExpiryService expires them and notifies viewers via ShareExpired. Admin UI shows a countdown while sharing. Server validates links on JoinShare and BroadcastSharedFrame (1 min – 7 days, or unlimited).
• Added: Real-time Device Ping — DevicePingService pings connected agents every 10 s; agents respond with Pong; RTT is shown in the connected devices list (PingMs, color-coded). Cleartext ping IDs only (no sensitive payload).
• Added: Telegram Notifications — Optional global setting in Agent settings: Telegram message when a device comes online. Settings persisted in telegram-settings.json (hot-reload); REST API api/telegram/settings + test endpoint; in-modal BotFather setup help.
• Added: Telegram /Get_info Command — TelegramCommandService polls Bot API getUpdates; /Get_info requests Computer Info from an online agent (multi-device selection in chat). Responses routed via hub (SendComputerInfoRequestToAgentAsync, telegram- requestId prefix). Only the configured chat ID is accepted.
• Fixed: Share Screen anonymous join — JoinShare added to hub anonymous allow-list so public viewers can connect without dashboard JWT.
• Security: Replay Attack Protection (EncryptedPacket) — All incoming EncryptedPacket messages are now protected against replay attacks on both the BackEnd and RemoteAgent sides. A new ReplayCache (in-memory nonce-cache, BackEnd/Security/ReplayCache.cs and RemoteAgent/Security/ReplayCache.cs) registers the SHA-256 fingerprint of every received encrypted blob; an identical blob is rejected immediately. In addition, packet.Timestamp is validated against a configurable time window (default 60 seconds, tunable via ReplayProtection:MaxAgeSeconds in appsettings.json) — stale packets are dropped with a warning log. Validation runs in DeviceControlHub.ReceiveEncryptedFromAdmin, DeviceControlHub.ReceiveEncryptedFromAgent and SignalRService.HandleReceiveEncryptedPacketAsync. AES-GCM already guaranteed confidentiality and integrity; ReplayCache adds freshness so a captured valid ciphertext (e.g. a shutdown or kill-process command) cannot be replayed later.
• Security: ConnectAsDevice bypass fix — Fixed a security vulnerability in DeviceControlHub.ConnectAsDevice. When AgentSecurity:RequireConnectToken was set to true, an attacker could bypass the enforcement by sending any unknown agentKeyId — TryGetConnectToken returned false for the unknown ID, causing the code to skip token validation and allow the connection as a legacy agent. Added an else if (requireToken) branch inside the agentKeyId block: if agentKeyId is provided but not found in the AgentKeys.json registry in strict mode, the connection is now rejected with HubException("Unauthorized") and a warning is logged (ConnectAsDevice: unknown agentKeyId rejected). The attacker would still need the shared AES_MASTER_KEY_HEX to communicate, but the RequireConnectToken enforcement now correctly covers all cases.