Drag-and-drop file & folder encryption for people who don't want to touch a CLI.
Drop a file or folder, set a password, a keyfile, or a recipient's public key — get back a single authenticated .zsec archive. Decrypt it anywhere ZEncrypt runs. No cloud, no key servers, no accounts.
Tauri 2 · Rust · React 19 · ChaCha20-Poly1305 · AES-256-GCM · Argon2id · BLAKE3 · X25519
Idle drop zone — drag files or folders to encrypt, drop a .zsec to decrypt.
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Encrypt screen — password or public-key mode, optional keyfile, cipher and KDF cost, compression toggle. |
Decrypt screen — header preview shows cipher, KDF cost and keyfile fingerprint before you type anything. |
Keyfile Manager — generate a 512-byte keyfile or an X25519 keypair, or inspect any key file's fingerprint. |
Settings — defaults for cipher, KDF cost, chunk size, secure-delete, clipboard auto-clear, randomized output filename. |
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| Tool | Why it falls short for "encrypt this and send it" |
|---|---|
| VeraCrypt | Volume-based. Overkill for sharing a single file. |
| GPG | CLI-first, painful key management, terrible UX for non-experts. |
| 7-Zip / WinRAR password | Not authenticated. Leaks filenames in the ZIP table. |
| age / rage | Great CLI, no GUI. |
openssl enc |
Nobody remembers the incantation. |
ZEncrypt is the missing GUI: modern AEAD ciphers, real KDF, public-key support, drag-and-drop, no setup.
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Password mode — for personal archives and one-off shares where you can communicate the password out-of-band.
You type a password. ZEncrypt runs it through Argon2id (interactive / moderate / paranoid preset, or custom) to derive a 256-bit key. The recipient needs the same password to decrypt.
Strength matters. The UI shows a live entropy estimate. The built-in generator produces high-entropy passwords; the clipboard auto-clears after a configurable delay so the password doesn't linger.
Keyfile mode — for two-factor decryption or for completely password-free flows.
Any file can be a keyfile (binary, photo, song — doesn't matter). ZEncrypt hashes it with BLAKE3 and feeds that into Argon2id. You can use a keyfile alone, or combine it with a password — in which case both are required to decrypt, and a stolen password alone is useless.
The keyfile fingerprint (first 4 bytes of BLAKE3) is stored in the header so the recipient can verify they're using the right one before they even try a password.
Public-key mode — for "I want strangers to be able to encrypt files to me without sharing a secret first."
The recipient generates an X25519 keypair in the Keyfile Manager. They get two files:
.zkey-pub— share it freely. Email it, tweet it, post it on your website. It can only encrypt, never decrypt..zkey-priv— keep it secret. It is the only key in the universe that can open archives encrypted to its public half.
The sender picks the recipient's .zkey-pub in the encrypt screen, drops files, hits Encrypt. ZEncrypt generates a fresh ephemeral X25519 keypair per archive, does ECDH to derive a wrap key, encrypts the per-archive file key with ChaCha20-Poly1305, and embeds the ephemeral public key + wrapped file key in the header.
No password is involved on either side. No pre-shared secret. The recipient's fingerprint is shown in the header so the sender can verify they're encrypting to the right person.
Warning: losing your
.zkey-privpermanently destroys access to every archive ever encrypted to its public half. There is no recovery. Back it up.
A .zsec file is a single binary blob with this layout:
+---------------------------+
| 63-byte plaintext header | magic + version + cipher + flags + KDF params + base nonce
+---------------------------+
| optional 4-byte keyfile | present when HAS_KEYFILE flag is set (v2+)
| fingerprint |
+---------------------------+
| optional 88-byte pubkey | ephemeral X25519 pubkey + recipient fingerprint + wrapped key (v3+)
| block |
+---------------------------+
| chunked AEAD payload | [u32 chunk_len_with_flag][ciphertext || 16-byte tag], repeated
| | high bit of length prefix marks the final chunk
+---------------------------+
| 32-byte BLAKE3 root | hash of pre-AEAD plaintext, defence-in-depth over per-chunk tags
+---------------------------+
Format version 3. The header is passed as AAD to every chunk, so any tampering with cipher choice, KDF params, or the pubkey block breaks all subsequent decryptions.
What an attacker with the file learns
- That it's a ZEncrypt archive (the magic bytes are public — this is true of every encrypted format).
- Roughly how big the plaintext was (from total file size, +/- chunk overhead and zstd compression).
- The cipher choice, KDF parameters, and (if pubkey mode) the recipient fingerprint.
That's it. Filenames, folder structure, file count, individual file sizes, and content are all encrypted inside the payload.
| Area | Capability |
|---|---|
| Input |
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| Encrypt |
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| Decrypt |
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| Reliability |
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| History |
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| Privacy ergonomics |
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| Look & feel |
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| Shortcut | Action |
|---|---|
| Ctrl+E | Encrypt the staged files |
| Ctrl+D | Decrypt the loaded archive |
| Ctrl+H | Open recent history |
| Ctrl+K | Open Keyfile Manager |
| Ctrl+, | Open Settings |
| Esc | Close modal / cancel running job |
Defaults
- Default cipher — ChaCha20-Poly1305 or AES-256-GCM. Both are equally secure; ChaCha is faster on CPUs without AES-NI (ARM, older x86, most mobile).
- Default KDF preset — Interactive (fast), Moderate, or Paranoid (1 GiB memory, ~5s).
- Default chunk size — 64 KiB (low memory), 256 KiB (recommended), or 1 MiB (fastest).
- Compress by default — Smart compression with an extension skip-list.
- Default secure-delete mode — Off, 1 pass, 3 pass (DoD 5220.22-M), or 7 pass (Gutmann-lite).
Behavior
- Auto-open output folder after success
- Remember last keyfile path — pre-fills the keyfile picker between sessions.
- Show SSD secure-delete warning — disable after you've read it once.
- Clear history on exit
- Compact mode — tighter spacing for smaller windows.
- Auto-clear clipboard — 0 / 15s / 30s / 60s / 120s.
- Randomize output filename — replaces the input-derived name with random hex.
- When output file exists — "Ask every time" vs. "Overwrite silently."
Pre-built binaries for Linux, macOS (Intel + Apple Silicon), and Windows are published at https://zsync.eu/zencrypt/. Each release ships with SHA-256 checksums.
Available formats:
- Windows —
.msiand.exe(NSIS) - macOS —
.dmg(separate Intel x64 and Apple Silicon builds) - Linux —
.deb,.rpm,.AppImage
Prerequisites
- Rust toolchain (stable)
- Node 24+ and pnpm 10.33+
- Platform build tools for Tauri 2 — see the Tauri prerequisites page
git clone https://github.com/TheHolyOneZ/ZEncrypt.git
cd ZEncrypt
pnpm install
pnpm tauri dev # run in dev mode
pnpm tauri build # produce a release bundle for your platformThe Tauri build produces native installers (deb / rpm / AppImage on Linux, dmg on macOS, msi / nsis on Windows) in src-tauri/target/release/bundle/.
| Project repository | https://github.com/TheHolyOneZ/ZEncrypt |
| Pre-built binaries | https://zsync.eu/zencrypt/ |
| Developer GitHub | https://github.com/TheHolyOneZ |
| More projects | https://zsync.eu/ |
These are also reachable from the About panel inside the app (top-left logo).
ZEncrypt assumes a trusted local machine at encrypt/decrypt time. It is not a vault, not a session manager, and does not aim to protect against:
- A malicious operating system or compromised user account
- Hardware attackers with physical access at the time you're typing your password
- Side channels (timing, power, EM) against the local CPU
- Loss of your own credentials — there is no recovery, by design
It does aim to protect against:
- Anyone who intercepts or stores the encrypted archive (cloud storage, email provider, ISP, USB drive in a drawer)
- Tampering with the archive in flight (any byte flip is detected, no plaintext is released)
- Truncation or chunk reordering attacks (caught by the STREAM construction and BLAKE3 root)
- Wrong-keyfile confusion (header carries a fingerprint hint)
- Phishing your password alone, if you also use a keyfile or public key
Copyright (C) 2026 TheHolyOneZ
ZEncrypt is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 3, or (at your option) any later version, as published by the Free Software Foundation.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with this program. If not, see https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.html.
Made for people who want strong, modern encryption without becoming cryptographers.