test(sdk): adversarial coverage for multi-surface crown-jewel capabilities (matrix R1)#357
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test(sdk): adversarial coverage for multi-surface crown-jewel capabilities (matrix R1)#357bordumb wants to merge 1 commit into
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…abilities (matrix R1) The capability matrix flagged five capabilities as reached from multiple front doors (or, for the agent-issuance ones, the highest-risk remote API cells). Per the architecture (thin front doors, logic in the SDK, tested once), their adversarial coverage belongs at the SDK/verifier layer, not per-surface. The audit found verify_chain (9), verify_with_keys (14), and authenticate_presentation (8) already well covered; the thin ones were add_scoped (1) and revoke_batch (2). Fills the genuine gaps (no padding of already-covered paths): - revoke_batch: empty-list no-op; mixed live/already-revoked seals only the live member but reports the whole set; an unparseable did fails closed (AgentNotFound). - add_scoped: a strict narrowing of the delegator scope is allowed; an empty scope is a valid capability-less delegation. - authenticate_presentation: a mis-sized (31-byte) nonce is a 400 client error, rejected at the wire boundary before any challenge/signature is trusted. - verify_chain: a revoked+expired attestation is rejected with a terminal status. - verify_with_keys: a valid signature verified under the wrong key is rejected (distinct from a tampered signature). Redundancy audit: no per-surface logic tests to remove — auths-api/rp_auth.rs fakes the crypto and tests only the real ChallengeStore + middleware translation, and no CLI/MCP test calls these SDK functions directly. Auths-Id: did:keri:EB5cPHY0t-ejNC_rUzPS1dclTvd6kG-R9mQzjozCuGgd Auths-Device: did:keri:EB5cPHY0t-ejNC_rUzPS1dclTvd6kG-R9mQzjozCuGgd Auths-Anchor-Seq: 1
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Auths Commit Verification
Result: ❌ 0/1 commits verified How to fixCommit 1. Install auths macOS: 2. One-time setup (creates your identity and configures Git) auths init3. Sign this branch and push auths sign origin/main..HEAD
git push --force-with-leaseFor CI to verify the signer, commit an identity bundle: auths id export-bundle --alias main --output .auths/ci-bundle.json --max-age-secs 31536000 |
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Matrix R1 — adversarial SDK coverage for the multi-surface crown-jewel capabilities
The capability matrix (recurse/matrix) flagged five capabilities as reached from 2+ front doors or as the highest-risk remote cells:
authenticate_presentation,add_scoped,revoke_batch,verify_chain,verify_with_keys. Per the architecture (thin front doors, logic in the SDK, tested once / used everywhere), their adversarial coverage belongs at the SDK/verifier layer — one test there covers CLI + API + MCP + FFI at once — never per-surface.Honest scoping (no padding)
An audit found three of the five already well covered:
verify_chain(9 tests),verify_with_keys(14),authenticate_presentation(8). The thin ones wereadd_scoped(1 direct) andrevoke_batch(2). This PR fills only the genuine gaps:revoke_batchAgentNotFound)add_scopedauthenticate_presentationverify_chainverify_with_keys8 new tests, all green (
cargo nextest run -p auths-sdk -p auths-verifier).Redundancy audit (the "no redundant tests floating around" ask)
Nothing to remove.
auths-api/tests/cases/rp_auth.rsexplicitly fakes the crypto (FakeVerifier) and tests only the realChallengeStore+ middleware translation — a correct thin boundary test, not a logic duplicate. No CLI/MCP test calls these SDK functions directly. The layering is already respected.Part of matrix ROADMAP_2 R1.